









Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Client and the 
Producer of Embedded Software 
 
Ilko Vrankić, Mirjana Pejić Bach, Mira Krpan 




Background: Our research assumes that the software quality affects the product 
validity. This assumption also refers to embedded software. Objectives: This paper 
analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the consumer is the leader and the 
producer of embedded software is the follower. Methods/Approach: A comparative 
statics analysis of a producer's reaction is carried out and confirms our intuition that 
the product price is positively correlated to the number of employees and the 
software quality. Results: An increase in wage has an adverse effect on producer’s 
reaction. Derived results are illustrated numerically and Stackelberg and cooperative 
equilibrium are compared. It is shown that the welfare loss is smaller with higher 
quality software for any number of employees. Conclusions: Although the equilibrium 
involves less employed workers, the optimal software quality is higher. The optimal 
product price is lower, which puts the consumer and the producer in a better 
position. 
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Embedded systems are one of the technologies that have great market potential 
with the possible large areas of further improvement. Embedded systems consist on 
interconnected hardware and software, and are important emerging market 
(Schlett, 2000) with the great prospect for growth as well with number of possible 
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 Goal of the paper is to find equilibrium in the Stackelberg model in which the 
relationship between the client and the producer of embedded sofwer is analysed 
(Bierman, 1993; Jehle, 2001; Mas-Collel, Whinston, Green, 1995). In the Stackelberg 
leadership model the follower firm acts like in the Cournot model and for the given 
level of production of the leader firm determines its own production level which 
maximizes economic profit (Simaan, Cruz, 1973; Fudenberg, Tirole, 1992; Osborne, 
Rubinstein, 1994). The leader firm chooses quantity knowing that the follower firm will 
react to it according to its reaction function. The product quality affects the 
likelihood of product safety and the consumers' utility but depends on the invested 
effort. The goal is to find equilibrium in the Stackelberg model where the client is the 
leader, and the producer is the follower. 
 In the first step, the producer chooses the number of units of labour for the given 
price of a product in order to maximize the expected profit. In this way the producer 
indirectly affects the software quality. In the paper the effect of the product price 
change on producer's reaction is analysed. The comparative statics results confirm 
our intuition. The higher the product price, the greater the level of labour units 
employed by the producer and the better the product. Increase in labour costs has 
opposite effect on the producer's decision. In the second step the consumer 
determines the product price in order to maximize his or her expected utility. This 
decision is affected by the producer's reaction or the price effect on the product 
quality. The consumer's utility and the software quality are usually directly related in 
the existing literature. In this paper, this relationship is complemented by the 
probability of product safety.  
 Theoretical optimization models which are solved by the client and the producer 
are illustrated numerically and the total welfare in the Stackelberg and the 
cooperative equilibrium is compared. The effect of the change in relationship 
between the employed labour units and the software quality on the given results is 
analysed. According to our numerical example, the more favourable this relationship 
is, the higher is the client's and the producer's welfare in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Even though fewer workers are employed, produced software is better. The total 
welfare loss is smaller due to more dominant effect of more favourable relationship 
between employees and the software quality in the Stackelberg equilibrium than in 
the cooperative equilibrium. Given the sensitivity of the results, future research should 
be devoted to examining the functional relationship between given variables in 
specific phenomena. The cost of software maintenance could also be taken into 
account. 
 
Model formulation  
Let  1,0q  denote the embedded software quality and let )(q  denote the 
probability of product safety. )(q  is an increasing function, and the following 
equalities hold 0)0(  and 1)1(  . It is assumed that the preferences of a 
consumer who uses valid product are described by the quasilinear utility function
mqumqv  )(),( , where m  is the composite commodity good. Expression )(qu  is 
then a concave function describing how software quality affects consumer's utility. It 
is assumed that there is no benefit from completely unprofessional software, 0)0( u  








Business Systems Research Vol. 5 No. 1 / March 2014 
Figure 1 








 Quasilinear preferences enable monetary measurement of consumer's utility. The 
price which is payed by the consumer for valid product is denoted by p  and the 
consumer's utility is equal to .)( pqu   This is actually the change in utility in relation to 
consumer's wealth. Since for quasilinear preferences consumer's wealth doesn't 
affect his or her decisions, it is omitted from the analysis. For the product which does 
not work properly the consumer does not pay.  
 
 The consumer's expected utility is equal to  
   pquq )()( . (1) 
 
 Let w  denote the potential mass of wages which describes the amount that the 
producer would spend on wages when employing a working potential. Let  1,0e  
denote part of a working potential that the producer employs. Then the mass of 
wages is described by the expressionwe . The producer earns income only if the 
product works. This income is equal to the price of the product. The expected profit 
of the producer is described by the following expression 
 
         (2) 
  
 It is assumed that the software quality is an increasing function of the employed 
labour units, )(eqq  . Furthermore we assume that the consumer or a client first 
determines the price of a product which the producer then takes into accounts and 
for given value of price maximizes the expected profit,  
                                                 (3)  
 
 We seek the Stackelberg equilibrium where the consumer is the leader, and the 
producer is the follower. The producer's reaction function ),(* wpe  describes the 
optimal number of labour units which maximizes producer's profit. By choosing the 
product price, the consumer indirectly affects the quality 
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The consumer takes into account the producer's reaction and maximizes his or her 
expected utility 
 




 In this Stackelberg model the sensitivity of the problem’s solution to changes in its 
parameters is examined. 
 
Comparative static analysis 
If the problem has interior solution, the producer derives the reaction function from 
the first order necessary conditions  
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 Second order necessary conditions are as follows 
 
   
(7) 
 






 By deriving it with respect to product price we get 
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 This comparative statics result confirms our intuition that the higher the product 
price, the more labor units the producer will hire which will produce high-quality 
software. Notice that  ),(* wpe  is a homogeneous function in wp,  with the degree of 










An increase in wages adversely affects the share of employees 
and indirectly the software quality.  
 
Numerical example  
If we normalize the potential mass of wages, 1w , the product price, the expected 
consumer's utility and the expected producer's profit are then expressed in terms of 
the potential mass of wages. Let's assume that the function which expresses the 
influence of software quality on consumer's utility is represented by the following 
expression qqu 2)(  , the probability of product validity with embedded software is 
represented by the function qq )(  and the quality of software in relation to the 
part of hired working potential is represented by 
2)( eeq  . In the first step the 
producer maximizes the expected profit 









max .                                                      (14) 
 
 The goal function is a concave function in the share of a hired working potential. If 





 it follows 
4
2
* pe  . Thus, the producer's reaction function is 















e                                                      (16) 
 
 It can be seen that in the relevant interval increase in price increases the share of 
hired labour units. The relationship between quality and the software price is 
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 Thus, as long as the product price is not greater than twice the mass of potential 
wages, increase in prices increases software quality. In the second step, based on 
producer’s reaction, consumer determines the price that maximizes his or her 
expected utility,  















.                                       (18)  
 From the first order necessary conditions represented by the following equality 












 pppp ,                                             (19) 
 it follows that the optimal product price which is determined by the consumer is 
.5625,0
16
9* p  The producer's reaction is described by the optimal hired share of 
the working potential 079101562,0
1024
81* e  and by the optimal software quality 
28125,0
32
9* q . The expected consumer's utility is equal to 052734375,0
512
27
  and 





Comparison of Stackelberg and cooperative equilibrium  
In the cooperative equilibrium the total expected consumer’s and producer's utility is 
maximized 
 
                                                (20) 
 
 
 In the example from the previous section, this problem is 















222max .                                 (21)  
 
 The goal function in this optimization problem is concave and reaches its extreme 
when the producer hires all workers 1* e . The software quality is then the highest
1* q . The sum of expected utility of a consumer and expected profit of a producer 
















12   Consumer's utility in the cooperative 
equilibrium is represented by ppu  2)1( . In order for a consumer to accept the 
cooperative equilibrium, this utility shouldn't be less than the expected utility in 



















2  p . (22) 
 
 Similarly, the producer accepts the cooperative equilibrium if his or her profit isn't 
less than the expected profit in Stackelberg equilibrium,  
 
                                                        
1024
81
1p .                                                            (23) 
  
 Thus, the cooperative equilibrium is described by the highest quality software and 












p . This 
interval describes the space for client-producer negotiation in the cooperative 
equilibrium. Its size is equal to the total welfare loss in Stackelberg equilibrium in 
relation to the cooperative equilibrium.  
 
 Now consider how the changes in employees-software quality relationship affect 
the obtained results. Let’s assume that 3
1
)( eeq  . Then, for each share of employees 
between 0 and 1, quality of embedded software is higher than in the previous case. 
For a given price of the product the producer maximizes the expected profit. 














 Based on producer’s reaction consumer determines the price that maximizes his 
or her expected utility 
 











p                                 (26)  
 
 The software price determined by the producer is lower. The optimal proportion of 
employed workers is 055555555,0* e  and the optimal software quality is 
381571414,0* q . Although the proportion of employed workers is lower, software 
quality is higher. Expected consumer's utility is higher 166666666,0)2( ***  pqq  
and higher is also expected producer's profit 111111111,0***  eqp . Let's notice 
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more favourable relationship between the software quality and proportion of 
employed workers.  
 In the cooperative equilibrium total consumer's and producer's expected utility is 
maximized 











2max .                                                     (27)  
 
 
 Optimal proportion of employees is 
2











q . In this case not all workers are employed and total 
expected welfare of consumers and producers is equal half the mass of potential 
wages. In Stackelberg equilibrium total consumer’s and producer’s welfare is 
approximately 277777777,0111111111,0166666666,0  .  It can be seen that welfare 
loss is equal to  30,22222222 of mass of potential wages.  This welfare loss is lower due 
to more dominant effect of more favourable proportion of employees-software 
quality relationship in Stackelberg equilibrium than in cooperative equilibrium.  
 
Conclusion  
In this paper the relationship between the producer of embedded software and the 
consumer is analysed using Stackelberg leadership model in which the consumer is 
the leader and the producer is the follower. It is assumed that the software quality is 
affected by the number of employees and that the producer maximizes the 
expected profit. It is also assumed that the software quality affects the product 
validity. The comparative statics analysis confirms our intuition that the higher the 
product price, more workers are employed and better software is produced. 
Adverse effect on producer's reaction has an increase in wage. Based on producer's 
reaction, the consumer determines the product price which maximizes his or her 
expected utility.  
 Derived results are illustrated by a numerical example in which Stackelberg and 
cooperative equilibrium are compared and the welfare loss is determined. This loss is 
smaller with higher quality software for any number of employees. Although less 
employed workers are involved in equilibrium, optimal software quality is higher. 
Optimal product price is lower what brings the consumer and the producer in better 
position. Future research will be devoted to derivation of general relationship 
between the software quality, probability of software validity, number of employees 
and the product price where the cost of software maintenance should also be 
taken into account.  
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